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SO:  This is Dr Sue Onslow interviewing Mr Farooq Sobhan, the former 
Bangladeshi diplomat, on Wednesday, 19th November 2014. Mr Sobhan 
held the position of Foreign Secretary from 1995 to 1997 and is 
presently the President of the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, an 
independent think tank in Dhaka. 
 
FS:  Welcome.  
 
SO:  Sir, if I could begin, please, by asking you of your recollections at the 
start of an independent Bangladesh. I understand you were a Foreign 
Service officer then. 
 
FS:  That’s right, yes. 
 
SO:  As the purpose of this interview project is to look at the history of the 
Commonwealth and its role as a diplomatic actor, did you have a 
particular view of the Commonwealth or a particular view of the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, Arnold Smith, and his contribution 
towards Bangladesh’s independence? 
 
FS:  Yes, I was quite aware of it, I would say, in the very early days. I, of course, 
had the pleasure of reading his book [Stitches in Time: The Commonwealth in 
World Politics (1983)], which, I should mention, was quite some time ago. But 
I am indeed very familiar with the important role he played both in support of 
Bangladesh and the admission of Bangladesh as a member of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Sir, did you have first-hand knowledge of this? Or was it more that 
Smith’s support became widely known within the Bangladesh 
diplomatic community? 
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FS:  It became widely known – I wasn’t directly involved in the early days when I 
served as Director in the Foreign Office. I was not dealing with the 
Commonwealth. Other colleagues were, but we were fairly small in number in 
those days so everyone knew pretty much everything that was happening in 
the Foreign Office. We were certainly aware about the important role of the 
Commonwealth and Arnold Smith, in particular. 
  
SO:  Did Arnold Smith involve you or work with you in any way in the 
approaches to other Commonwealth heads of government for 
Bangladesh to join the Commonwealth?  
 
FS:  This subject was, as I mentioned earlier, dealt with by other people in the 
Foreign Office. But I was aware and certainly knew about his support and the 
role that he had been playing in supporting Bangladesh’s membership. 
 
SO:  Sir, where were you serving at that particular time? 
 
FS:  Well, I was in Paris in 1971 and then came back to join the Foreign Office 
early in 1972, shortly after the newly-established Foreign Office in Dhaka 
began operation. 
 
SO:  Sir, did the Foreign Office then work with Arnold Smith in terms of 
identifying Bangladesh’s needs in its reconstruction following the War? 
Because there were enormous challenges… 
 
FS:  I was a relatively junior officer in those days in the Foreign Office. I was 
dealing with East Asia and the Americas and therefore was not directly 
dealing with the Commonwealth or our membership of the Commonwealth. 
  
SO:  As far as you were concerned in your professional capacity, then, at 
what point did you personally start to interact with the Commonwealth 
in its various forms? 
 
FS:  I would say that began with Sonny Ramphal, who I had the pleasure of 
meeting several times when he was Secretary General of the Commonwealth 
during his three terms. And, indeed, from 1978 – early in 1978 – until August 
1981, I was Director General in the Foreign Ministry, responsible for 
international organisations which included, of course, the Commonwealth. 
 
  So, I was – you might say, at that particular juncture – the point man in the 
government insofar as the Commonwealth was concerned. I attended a 
number of Commonwealth meetings and had a number of meetings with the 
Secretary General. I attended the Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka in 1979. 
Even after I moved in 1981 to the UN, I continued to occasionally meet with 
the Secretary General – particularly on visits to London – and then again I 
was a member of the Bangladesh delegation at the Commonwealth Summit 
in Delhi in 1983. So, yes, I would say [that] during the Ramphal years I did 
interact very closely with Sonny Ramphal and, indeed, I would say that I 
continued to do so pretty much thereafter. So, I had several meetings with 
him and also had a close relationship with the Commonwealth when Emeka 
was the Secretary General. I was then, subsequently, the number two man in 
the Foreign Office, again dealing with the Commonwealth, and then later was 
the Foreign (Permanent) Secretary and again therefore had many 
opportunities to be involved with the Commonwealth. So, yes, I would say 
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pretty much from 1978 until today – which would make it, what, 36 years – 
I’ve had a very close, you might say, relationship with the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Sir, there are a considerable number of questions I’d like to put to you 
coming out of your summary of your career. Please, how much 
importance did you – and do you – attach to senior officials’ networks in 
the Commonwealth? 
 
FS:  Oh, I would consider it very important, because a lot of the groundwork clearly 
is done by senior officials. So, we really have multiple levels at which there is 
contact between member states and the Commonwealth, with its work and its 
programmes. There is contact at the level of senior officials. The senior 
officials could be Permanent Secretaries, as well as people who directly deal 
with the Commonwealth. It will be the relevant Director in the FCO in London, 
and, in our case, it’s the Director General (International Organisations). And 
then, of course, you have the interaction at the ministerial and the summit-
level, depending on the activities. So, yes, I would say it’s multi-dimensional 
and multi-faceted. 
  
SO:  You also mentioned that your first particular personal/professional 
contact with the Commonwealth came when Sonny Ramphal was 
already Secretary General. How would you describe and analyse his 
particular way of working, and why it was that he was a particularly 
effective Secretary General? 
 
FS:  In those days, the Commonwealth – for a number of reasons, at least in my 
view – enjoyed a high profile. It certainly struck me as an important 
organisation which a country like Bangladesh should take seriously. If 
memory holds good, with some exceptions. I remember one such exception 
would have been CHOGM in Auckland, which I attended but which our Prime 
Minister didn’t. But, as a rule, our prime ministers have been quite particular 
about attending the Heads of Government Meeting, which is one important 
indication of the country’s position and views about the Commonwealth.   
 
  Going back to Sonny, I would say [there are] three reasons which put the 
Commonwealth on the global map during Sonny’s tenure as SG. One was 
Sonny and his personality – his articulation, and the fact that he was a 
recognised personality on the global scene. Secondly, there was the role that 
the Commonwealth played, particularly in the decolonisation process. So, you 
had the birth of Zimbabwe, which effectively came out of the 1979 CHOGM. 
You had the longstanding campaign against apartheid and, eventually, I 
would say, the Commonwealth – along with others, of course – played an 
important role in the release of Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid in 
South Africa. And these were all, I would say, occasions when the 
Commonwealth – and I think rightly so – enjoyed a very high profile and 
occupied centre stage insofar as global issues and global politics were 
concerned. 
 
I think there is a third point that needs to be mentioned apart from Sonny 
Ramphal’s personality and the role of the Commonwealth in the whole 
decolonisation process and the campaign against apartheid. It was Sonny’s 
initiative in setting up a number of Commissions and the very proactive role 
played by him and the Commonwealth in addressing some of the burning 
economic issues of the day, including the need for a more equitable economic 
order and various subjects related to it. 
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  At the time, I moved from the Foreign Office to our UN Mission in New York. I 
was the Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative in our mission in 
New York, so we are now talking about the period August 1981 to August 
1984. During this period, I was elected Chairman of the Group of 77 in New 
York, which is a group which speaks on behalf, at that time – I forget the 
exact number – some 127 developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. So, the work which the Commonwealth was doing proved to be 
extremely useful for us at the UN, because we were engaged in a dialogue 
with the developed countries, the OECD countries, in trying to enter into 
global negotiations to restructure a number of international organisations – 
including the World Bank, the IMF – to set up the World Trade Organisations, 
to look at issues relating to decision-making at the UN, all of which, in a 
sense, was part of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) we were 
trying to promote, and which Sonny, in a sense, was a key champion of and, 
through his commissions, contributed significantly to the debate and to the 
dialogue on the NIEO. 
 
  So, another important point of contact which I had with Sonny was through 
the Group of 77, when I was the chairman. Within the G-77, we were also 
strongly promoting South-South cooperation, otherwise referred to as 
Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC).  And one of the 
ideas which I had discussed with Sonny at the time…I recall writing to Sonny 
to say we in the Group of 77 wanted to set up an independent commission to 
promote South-South cooperation and would Sonny be willing to chair such a 
group. We discussed that. And then, as chance would have it, I moved from 
New York to Malaysia as High Commissioner where I pushed this idea with 
Dr Mahathir, as I worked closely with him. As a part of this initiative, Dr 
Mahathir invited Sonny on a number of occasions to visit Malaysia, and we 
were able to then take this initiative to fruition with the establishment of the 
South Commission in 1987. And it was eventually not Sonny but Julius 
Nyerere who chaired the Commission, but Sonny was a member of the 
Commission and a very active member of the Commission, which was known 
as the South Commission. To this day, we have the South Centre in Geneva 
working on ECDC and other issues of concern to the Third World: this is a 
legacy of the South Commission. The South Commission produced a report, 
and Dr Manmohan Singh – who later became Prime Minister of India – was 
the Secretary General of the Commission. So, as you can see, there were a 
number of key Commonwealth players, so to speak, who were involved in this 
initiative: Dr Mahathir, Julius Nyerere, Sonny Ramphal and Dr Manmohan 
Singh. So, as I said, right through from 1978 onwards there was a fairly deep, 
if you like, engagement with Sonny and also with the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Sir, could I please ask you, when you were chair of the Group of 77 
during your posting in New York, did you identify any undertow of 
opposition, disquiet or resentment among some of the members of that 
group towards the Commonwealth? I’ve spoken to other economists 
who said that the Commonwealth’s position wasn’t necessarily seen as 
totally helpful to the Group of 77, because it appeared to be more 
moderate in trying to broker or to suggest ways forward between West-
South. The more radical members of the G-77, meanwhile, felt that it 
could be advantageous to push for a harder and more robust line, rather 
than to present something that was seemingly moderate, for fear that 
that could mean further accommodation and loss of a particular 
position. 
5 
 
 
FS:  Well, that’s a rather interesting comment. The dialogue and the meetings 
were taking place in New York, and so, in a sense, the Commonwealth was 
not directly involved in this process. So, within the Group of 77, we had 
different schools of thought. There were some who were quite radical in their 
position on the NIEO and ECDC. There were others, including myself, who 
were seeking, if you like, a common platform on which we could work with the 
developed countries or the member states of the OECD. So, I suppose you 
could say that my views and thinking on this would have been fairly closely 
aligned with those of Sonny, as reflected in the work of the Commonwealth. 
  
  What I can recall – and what we were certainly aware of – was the fact that 
there were a number of countries who didn’t take kindly to either Sonny or to 
some of Sonny’s initiatives. I would probably suspect Britain being foremost 
among them, since this was also the period when Mrs Thatcher was Prime 
Minister. I think there was a school of thought which, indeed, in later years, 
became much more pronounced and visible, when you had some countries –  
notably, Britain, and to some extent Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
popularly known as the ABC countries – who were unhappy with some of the 
initiatives taken by Sonny. So, it wasn’t that Sonny, his initiatives and his kind 
of highly proactive role were appreciated by all the member states of the 
Commonwealth. I think there was criticism, and some of it was fairly vocal 
and visible, but there were others – certainly among the developing countries 
– who supported Sonny’s initiatives.  
 
          There were initiatives taken by Sonny in support of the ‘Small States’, another 
very important initiative because, by then – I forget the exact number – some 
32 countries, roughly, more than half the membership of the Commonwealth, 
fell into the category of small states. 25 of the Small States were small island 
developing states, most notably in the Caribbean, but you also had a few 
island states in the Pacific. We had also some states in Africa and the Indian 
Ocean – Seychelles, Mauritius and the Maldives – so it was quite a sizeable 
group. And then we had this interesting initiative of a collective representation 
at the United Nations. I forget the exact number – I think it was a group of five 
or six countries that came together to have a collective mission supported by 
the Commonwealth. 
 
  So, we did see a very engaged and active Commonwealth, and I suppose it’s 
no secret that when Sonny threw his hat in the ring for the post of Secretary 
General of the United Nations, there were some countries which not only 
didn’t support him but actively campaigned against him. 
  
SO:  Yes, that was in 1981. I understand Lord Carrington said that he would 
“personally swim the Atlantic to vote against Sonny becoming SG of the 
UN.” 
 
FS:  So, I was around in those days and…Yes, so, Sonny, in a sense, paid the 
price for his activism and support of certain causes, which were not very 
popular among some of the member states of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Well, indeed. He certainly followed the instruction from Mrs Gandhi 
when he first became Secretary General, who told him, “You’ve got to 
shake it up! You’ve got to shake up the Commonwealth.” So, he 
certainly seized that remit with both hands.   
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  Sir, if I could ask you, please, your view on this. You talked about going 
as High Commissioner to Malaysia and working with Dr Mahathir on a 
number of Commonwealth-related issues. What was your perception of 
Dr Mahathir’s view of the Commonwealth when you arrived, and did you 
see it alter during the time that you were in Kuala Lumpur? 
 
FS:  I think it’s fair to say that, when I arrived in Kuala Lumpur in August 1984, Dr 
Mahathir had a rather dim view of the Commonwealth. I think much of this 
probably had to do with the somewhat acrimonious relations that existed 
between him and Mrs Thatcher. One of the key foreign policy advisors of Dr 
Mahathir was a close friend – who, alas, has passed away. This was Tan Sri 
Dr Noordin Sopiee. Noordin, at that time, was the head of Malaysia’s premier 
think tank, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, ISIS – which 
obviously bears no relationship to the ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] 
of today… 
  
SO:  No! 
 
FS:  …that’s currently in the news. Noordin worked closely with Dr M. I think he 
helped in writing some of his speeches. And so, when the issue of Dr M’s 
participation in the Commonwealth Summit in 1985 came up, there was some 
talk about whether Dr M would attend it or not. Well, I would like to think that 
both Noordin and myself argued strongly in favour of Dr Mahathir going to 
Nassau. One of the reasons that we argued in favour of his participation was 
that this would provide an excellent opportunity for him to promote the South 
Commission. Later, on his way to attend the Non-Aligned summit in Harare 
[1-6 September 1986], Dr M met with Julius Nyerere and was able to gain his 
support for the idea of the South Commission. 
 
  Then, of course, at the CHOGM in Vancouver in 1987, he surprised everyone 
by offering to host the next CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, where Emeka 
was elected Secretary General. So, it was what I would call almost a 180 
degree turnaround in the position of both Dr M and Malaysia. 
 
SO:  Sir, would you say that this reconfiguration of the Malaysian Head of 
State’s focus on the Commonwealth was a product of advice from 
Foreign Service officials? I know that ISIS prepared a report arguing the 
pros of the Commonwealth as well as the cons, as did the Foreign 
Ministry in Malaysia. Had Dr Mahathir himself come to see how the 
Commonwealth could be used as a platform for Malaysian national 
interest? That is, as a way to reach out to individual African states, to 
promote trade and development, but also to set Malaysia more on the 
regional and international scene in south-east Asia? 
 
FS:  Absolutely; 100%. One of the very interesting initiatives which Dr M took in 
later years was reaching out to African heads of government from the 
Commonwealth. And, indeed, he was involved in setting up a forum which, 
while not strictly under the umbrella of the Commonwealth, did have certainly 
some element of the Commonwealth in it – particularly since the 19 or so 
African countries that he reached out to were all member states of the 
Commonwealth. And he would meet with them regularly: once a year in Africa 
and once a year in Malaysia. This initiative was the Commonwealth Smart 
Partnership Summit.  I attended one of the summit meetings as a special 
guest. This was during the time when I was campaigning for the post of 
Secretary General of the Commonwealth: I thought the Smart Partnership 
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was a splendid initiative taken by Dr M. It focussed on creating investment 
opportunities for the Malaysian private sector to invest in Africa. Indeed, I 
forget, but at one time, possibly during that visit to this event – it was at 
Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe – I was told that Malaysia was the largest foreign 
investor in some nine or ten of the African Commonwealth member states. 
So, it wasn’t simply a talk show, it was backed by action. There were lots of 
business interests involved, and so he walked the walk: that was something 
which I certainly gave Dr Mahathir high marks for. 
 
SO:  Sir, you say you attended a number of Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meetings. This is a time when the press pay particular 
attention to the Commonwealth, and so it is certainly a highlight for the 
Commonwealth organisation. How far did you perceive that this 
question of personal contact – the personal chemistry between heads – 
was valuable glue for the organisation? 
 
FS:  Oh, extremely. I thought, in fact, [that] the essence of CHOGM was the 
interaction between the heads. The Retreat, where heads mingled without 
their aides... The whole dynamics of that process was what made the 
Commonwealth, as an organisation, unique. You now have a Retreat in some 
of the other regional groups and organizations like SAARC, but I would say 
this whole idea of the need to see the heads together in an informal setting, 
where they could talk to each other without aides, came out of the 
Commonwealth and the CHOGM process. Going back to Lusaka, it was really 
the Retreat where you saw Malcolm Fraser and a few others prevail on Mrs 
Thatcher to give ground on the Rhodesia issue, which eventually led to the 
birth and independence of Zimbabwe. Similarly, when I attended CHOGM as 
Foreign Secretary in Auckland, although I did not attend the closed door 
meeting, I was at Millbrook where we had the Retreat. It was the way Nelson 
Mandela took charge and his personality that resulted in the birth of CMAG. If 
it wasn’t for Mandela, it was highly unlikely that the Africans would have 
agreed to take action against Abacha’s Nigeria at that time. 
  
SO:  Yes, indeed. Sir, if I could ask about your recollections of Lusaka. You 
commented about Malcolm Fraser being of key importance in pressing 
Mrs Thatcher to go for an all-party conference. I know that there was a 
particular group of heads that stayed behind in Kenneth Kaunda’s study 
with Sonny Ramphal, while others went off to the Retreat. I just 
wondered if you recall at what point you realised that this was going on. 
Does there seem to be, at the retreats, a particular core of leaders that 
emerge or drive business? You suggest that again, in Auckland and 
Millbrook, Mandela was of critical importance in persuading his 
colleagues. Is there a pattern of a leader/group that emerges at a 
retreat? 
 
FS:  I think very much so. I recall in the closed door sessions which I was 
privileged to attend at Lusaka, Nyerere was loud and clear on the subject of 
Rhodesia. He set the tone for the discussions on Rhodesia. I think that these 
discussions possibly prompted Malcolm Fraser to understand and appreciate 
the strong feeling and mood of the African Heads that were present. Mention 
should also be made of the role played by Kenneth Kaunda. The personality 
and deft handling of the summit proceedings by the Zambian President, Mr 
Kaunda, who was chairing the Summit, eventually led to the meeting of a 
group of Heads at the Retreat which resulted in the break-though. And you 
see this happening in other Commonwealth Summits. Of course, I’m not sure 
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we will ever see someone match the kind of authority commanded by Nelson 
Mandela at the 1995 CHOGM or see a Head of Government dominate the 
proceedings the way Nelson Mandela did at the summit. 
 
SO:  I understand that, at the Millbrook Retreat, there were two identified 
gainsayers [who were] against suspending Nigeria and the idea of 
CMAG: one was Robert Mugabe, and the other was Dr Mahathir. I 
understand from talking to Jim Bolger – who was, of course, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister and host of that meeting – that he and Nelson 
Mandela agreed to divide the responsibility of persuading these leaders 
between them. Mandela decided to talk to Robert Mugabe and Jim 
Bolger talked to Dr Mahathir to persuade them of the necessity of this. 
 
FS:  Yes, well, as I said, I was not inside the room at the Retreat, frankly, but I did 
get some feedback from at least one person who was inside the room. It’s 
interesting that the person who was representing India on behalf of his Prime 
Minister was their Foreign Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, who now happens 
to be the President of India. 
 
SO:  [Laughter]. 
 
FS:  And immediately after the Retreat was over, the head of our delegation and I 
met with Mr Mukherjee and the Indian Foreign (Permanent) Secretary and we 
did a post-mortem on what happened. And yes, I would say I have no reason 
to take issue with what you’ve just said regarding the role of Nelson Mandela 
and, of course, Mr Bolger at that time. 
  
SO:  So, was that standard practice for the Bangladeshi and Indian High 
Commissioners and Permanent Secretaries to get together at a 
Commonwealth meeting to have a post-mortem from a South Asian 
point-of-view? 
 
FS:  As you rightly pointed out, so much of this came out of not simply your own 
personal contacts, but the opportunities that an occasion like the Retreat 
provided for people to talk to each other on the side-lines. So, we certainly 
seized that opportunity. Both the head our delegation – who later became 
Foreign Minister, Mr Morshed Khan – and myself knew Mr Pranab Mukherjee 
extremely well. I had served as High Commissioner to India, during which 
period of time I got to know Mr Mukherjee extremely well and then I knew my 
counterpart the Indian Foreign Secretary extremely well. So, whenever we 
had an opportunity and found ourselves in the same city, we would meet. In 
this case, we were in the same complex at Millbrook, so we did certainly seize 
that opportunity to spend some time together. 
 
SO:  Sir, would you say that, in addition to the contact between heads and 
the contact between senior officials, there’s also – as far as the 
Commonwealth is concerned – that beneficial loop of the High 
Commissioners’ regular meetings in post? 
 
FS:  Absolutely. Obviously, the High Commissioners have a very important role to 
play, and they provide guidance and set the tone. I don’t know what the 
number is today, but I reckon we must have something pretty close to the 
entire membership of the Commonwealth represented in London through their 
High Commissioners. So, that is certainly a very important and useful platform 
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to sort of support the work of the Commonwealth and provide it with a certain 
degree of guidance. 
  
SO:  Sir, thank you for that. Please, could I ask your views on CMAG as it 
evolved out of the Millbrook Declaration? I am aware that, in the latter 
part of the 1990s, one of your key platforms in your bid to be Secretary 
General was indeed a reform of CMAG? 
 
FS:  Well, at one level, I was certainly all for CMAG. There were issues, in a 
sense, which were articulated by Dr Mahathir about this being an instrument 
to be used primarily by the ABC countries to interfere in the affairs of the 
smaller developing countries in the Commonwealth, and that this was 
essentially a kind of one-way traffic, so to speak. My view on this was that a 
small ministerial action group would be certainly very important in terms of 
getting people to take the Commonwealth more seriously, because otherwise 
it was essentially a case of the Commonwealth acquiring a certain degree of 
prominence and relevance only when CHOGM or the summit took place. In 
between, there was a kind of a vacuum. So, CMAG would, in some ways, fill 
that vacuum. It would also address the issue – which remains a burning issue 
today – of the relevance of the Commonwealth. 
 
  So, I think CMAG did, to some extent, fulfil that role, but the fact of the matter 
is [that] a lot of countries in the membership – particularly in Africa – had 
reservations because they saw this as really something which was used by 
the ABC countries to focus attention on some of their misdeeds: violation of 
human rights and Zimbabwe being, of course, the most notable cases. My 
view on this was that we should balance the political agenda with the 
economic and social agenda, so that CMAG should not simply meet to 
address issues relating to the violation of human rights or where democracy 
was being threatened, but should also address the plight of its member states 
– whether it’s a humanitarian crisis or whether it’s the need for urgent 
economic assistance of one kind or another.  
 
  So, in a sense, the idea was to make CMAG in to a kind of a mini-
Commonwealth Security Council with a fairly broad-based mandate, and 
where we wouldn’t necessarily have the problem which we currently face in 
the functioning of the [UN] Security Council, where you have five member 
states armed with the veto and where the Council can only act if and when all 
five permanent members agree on something. That, as we all know, is not 
very often. 
 
SO:  How much support did you get for your suggestion that you should 
expand CMAG into being really a mini-Commonwealth security council? 
At what point did you decide to stand for the Secretary General 
position? 
 
FS:  Oh, well, that came during my period as Foreign (Permanent) Secretary. The 
Commonwealth had never had a Secretary General from Asia and our Prime 
Minister at the time – who happens to be Prime Minister today, Sheikh Hasina 
– was someone who was quite committed to the Commonwealth. Part of this, 
of course, also goes back to the early days of Bangladesh and the fact that 
her father took a keen interest in the Commonwealth, and also the role played 
by Arnold Smith… 
  
SO:  Indeed. 
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FS:  …and the membership of the Commonwealth. So, when this issue of who 
would be the next Secretary General came up, I think we had already got 
some indication of the interest of the then-Deputy Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, Don McKinnon, in the position. Some of us took the view that it 
should be someone from Asia. And the Prime Minister, during the CHOGM in 
Edinburgh, spoke – I wasn’t there, so this is second-hand information – she 
spoke to two persons in Edinburgh. One was Mr Gujral, then-Prime Minister 
of India, who again was someone I happened to know extremely well from my 
days in Delhi as High Commissioner. When I arrived in Delhi in 1992, he was 
not holding any official position and we became – if I can be so bold as to use 
the term – good friends. We saw each other often, and so when he later 
became Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, I still had the privilege of being 
able to see him and he remembered our earlier relationship. The same was 
the case with Dr Mahathir, whom I got to know extremely well during my 
tenure as High Commissioner in Malaysia. Reportedly, Sheikh Hasina spoke 
to both of them in Edinburgh. She first asked them whether either India or 
Malaysia were planning to field a candidate for the post of Secretary General. 
When they both indicated that there were no such plans, she mentioned the 
fact that there had, so far, been no Secretary General from Asia. She raised 
the issue with the two of them, in particular, because India and Malaysia were 
the two, in a sense, most proactive member states within the Commonwealth 
from Asia: Dr M, because he was such a dominant personality in Asia; in the 
case of India, because it was India and India, certainly, in my view, loomed 
large within the framework of the Commonwealth.  
 
  So she spoke to the two of them and said, ‘What are your thoughts about the 
Commonwealth, and are you planning to field a candidate, and how would 
you react if I nominated Farooq for this position?’ And my information – as I 
said, I was not there – was that she received an enthusiastic response from 
both Mr Gujral as well as Dr Mahathir, which eventually led to my 
candidature. What happened was that Dr M remained not only committed but 
– again, my information is [second hand] – he lobbied very actively in 
supporting my candidature. Unfortunately, he didn’t show up at the Durban 
summit in November 1999 because it coincided with the run up to the General 
Elections in Malaysia and, therefore, reportedly, at least, the large number of 
Commonwealth countries – in particular, from Africa – who had promised him 
that they would support my candidature may not, in fact, have done so. The 
long and short of it is that Don McKinnon was the person chosen by the 
Heads of Government in the straw poll that is traditionally held to determine 
which candidate should be formally elected at the closed door meeting of the 
Heads in Durban under the chairmanship of President Mbeki of South Africa. 
 
  The other, I think, important development was that – shortly after Edinburgh – 
Mr Gujral ceased to be Prime Minister and Mr Vajpayee became Prime 
Minister. I would say that the attitude of [Vajpayee’s] BJP Government at that 
time was not particularly helpful. I would have, frankly, based the argument in 
support of my candidature as hinging very much on getting the support of the 
Asian region behind my candidature, and, obviously, if that support was not 
forthcoming, then I would say it seriously undermined my chances. So, India 
sat on the fence. They did, eventually… I was at Durban. Our Prime Minister 
was told by the Indian Prime Minister that India would support my candidature 
and the Indian Foreign Minister told me something similar, but my own feeling 
was that India’s support came rather late in the day, and had the Indians 
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come out more openly in support, as I had hoped they would, we may – I’m 
not saying we would – we may have seen a somewhat different outcome. 
 
SO:  Indeed. Sir, please if I could just ask you, coming out of those 
remarks… During your time as a leading Bangladeshi foreign service 
officer and leading civil servant, how had you regarded India’s 
commitment and involvement in the Commonwealth? You have said 
that, in the early part of the 1990s, India was very much more involved, 
but then you’ve indicated in the second part of that decade a greater 
degree of distance. I’m aware that, in the earlier period, when Mrs 
Gandhi was Prime Minister of India, that the Non-Aligned Movement was 
seen to be the principal platform and vehicle for India’s foreign policy, 
and that her successors had a varying degree of commitment to that. 
I’m constantly struck by India: although it is the largest democracy 
within the Commonwealth, it appears relatively reticent to use ‘the 
Commonwealth’ in quite the same way that Dr Mahathir came to use the 
association. 
 
FS:  No, absolutely. I should add [that] many years later, when the election for the 
Secretary General took place, I had then strongly argued – as indeed I 
argued when I was campaigning for the position of Secretary General – that 
we needed to make the Commonwealth more broad-based and that the 
support of countries like India, South Africa, [and] Malaysia was crucial to the 
future of the Commonwealth: to its relevance and to its engagement in the 
international community. And so, I argued [that] when India floated the 
candidature of Kamalesh Sharma, who is now the Secretary General, that 
perhaps the best way of ensuring India’s engagement in the Commonwealth 
is through electing an Indian Secretary General. We have had an Indian 
Secretary General for the past seven years or so, and what is, in a sense, 
ironical, as far as I’m concerned, is that during most of this period we had Dr 
Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister of India, where we had ample evidence 
of Mrs Gandhi’s legacy as distinct from Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy. But the 
degree of interest and involvement and support extended by India to the 
Commonwealth, I think, at least in my view, left a lot to be desired. 
  
SO:  Sir, how much is that a product of India’s foreign policy being shaped 
more by its regional interactions? By this I mean its regional 
interactions in the North-West with Pakistan, its regional interactions 
across its other frontiers with Bangladesh, the southern dimension of 
India’s foreign policy down towards Sri Lanka, and because these 
regional issues have a direct bearing on Indian domestic politics. So, 
India’s foreign policy is formulated in a very different way? 
 
FS:  Well, I suppose many issues come into play here. India is today – 
unquestionably – not simply a regional power, but I would look upon India as 
an emerging global power. So, they have a very active ‘Look East’ policy. 
Central to this is its engagement with ASEAN and the Asia Pacific region: with 
Japan and with China. When I was ambassador in China some 25 years or so 
ago, Sino-Indian trade was less than $1 billion; today, the two countries 
expect their bilateral trade to cross $100 billion in the next two years. India’s 
relations with Russia remain close and the strategic partnership with the US 
has received a strong boost [with] Mr Modi taking over as PM. So, there’s 
been a change, and India has been lobbying aggressively – albeit with limited 
success – for a Permanent seat on the Security Council. So, India’s global 
agenda has, in my view, changed significantly. And I would have argued that, 
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if India wished, it could have made the Commonwealth a rather useful 
platform – a platform which India could have easily dominated rather than 
allowing, if you like, Australia, Britain and Canada to run the show. But the 
long and short of it is [that] this hasn’t happened. I would basically say that 
there’s been very little interest, and my guess is that part of this goes back to 
the BJP government and their strong sense of national identity, their views 
about the Raj – the British Raj – and I would add to that their view that the 
Commonwealth is essentially a legacy of the past. Therefore, over-
fraternisation or support for the Commonwealth didn’t quite gel with how they 
see the Commonwealth and its future, and my guess is that India’s interest in 
the Commonwealth under Modi will further decline rather than increase.  
 
  So, the challenge, really, for any Secretary General, as far as I’m concerned, 
has always been trying to reach out to the membership as a whole – to our 
friends in Africa and the Caribbean and so on. And yes, there are three or 
four issues where I think they have carved out a niche for themselves in terms 
of relevance: there’s the whole election monitoring process, which I think the 
Commonwealth does well; the support for the small states and that 
programme; and then, to some extent, the role played by CMAG. But it still 
remains an organisation where, in my view, at least, the ABC countries 
exercise a disproportionate influence. And a lot of this has to do with the 
interest and the degree of financial commitment of the other member states – 
most notably India and countries in Africa. So, this, once again, I think, brings 
to the forefront the whole issue of the relevance and what it is the 
Commonwealth is really all about? 
  
SO:  Indeed. Sir, that’s a very good point for us to end the first part of our 
discussion. Thank you very much indeed. 
 
FS:  Sure, I’d be quite happy to do a follow-up. 
 
 
  [END OF AUDIOFILE PART ONE] 
 
